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PROBLEMS OF ARSON INVESTIGATION ARISING UNDER
STATE FIRE MARSHAL ACTS
In an effort to increase the effectiveness of
fire prevention authorities, more than three-
quarters of the states have enacted fire marshal
legislation.' Such statutes have endeavored to
Ar. CODE tit. 55, §§ 29-59 (Supp. 1953);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82:801-805 (Supp. 1955); CAL.
H. & S. CODE ANN. §§ 13100-13146 (Supp. 1953);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. §43664-3693 (Supp. 1953); FaA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 633.01-633.17 (Supp. 1954); ILL.
AwNr . STAT. c. 127.w, §§ 6-21 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1955); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 20: 801-820 (Bums
Supp. 1955); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 100: 1 to -34
(Supp. 1955); KAN. GEN. STAT. §§31: 201 to -210
(Supp. 1953); KY. REv. STAT. c. 227, §§ 227: 200 to
-990 (Baldwin 1955); LA. REv. STAT. §§ 40: 1561
to -1592 (Cum. Supp. 1952); ME. REv. STAT. c. 97,
§§ 1-72 (Supp. 1955); M1Do. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
art. 48A, §§ 83-96 (Supp. 1954); MASS. ANN. LAws
c. 148, §§ 1-8 (Supp. 1955); MIcE. STAT. ANN.
§§4: 559(1) to -(26) (Supp, 1955); MnN. STAT.
§§ 73.01 to -. 29 (1949); Miss. STAT. ANN. §§ 5699-
5704 (Supp. 1954); MoNr. REV. CoDEs ANN. §§ 82:
1201 to -1237 (Supp. 1955); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 81: 501 to -541 (Cum. Supp. 1955); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. c. 175, §§ 22-28 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT.
§§ 40: 22-16 to -22 (Supp. 1955); N. M. LAws 1955,
c. 214; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 69.1 to -. 7 (Supp. 1955);
N. D. REv. CoDE §§ 18: 0101 to-0132 (Supp. 1953);
OnIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3737.01 to -. 99 (Baldwin
1953); OKrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 311-323 (Supp.
1955); OmE. REV. STAT. §§ 476.010 to -. 990 (Supp.
1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 3591-3603 (Purdon
1954); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 354, §§ 1-9 (1938); S. C.
CODE §§ 1160-1198 (Cum. Supp. 1955); S. D. CODE
§§ 1.0301 to -0307 (Supp. 1953); TFNz. CODE A-,.
clearly define and to enlarge the legal author-
ity of fire prevention agencies. In addition to
conferring upon the fire marshal or his counter-
part- powers sufficient to prevent the outbreak
of fire,3 these statutes have been designed to
facilitate the investigation of fires subsequent
to their occurrence. However, existing legisla-
tion contains various provisions which are
totally inadequate to accomplish their objec-
tives. Some statutes do not confer sufficient
powers to enable the fire marshal to act effec-
tively, whereas others appear to confer powers
which are so broad as to exceed the require-
8§ 53.2401 to -2446 (Supp. 1955); TEx. Crv. STAT.
ANN., INSURANCE CODE art. 543-546 (Supp. 1955);
VT. REv. CODE §§ 10,338 to -,365 (1947); VA. CoDE
§§ 27.30 to -. 37, 27.55 to -. 85 (1954); W. VA. CODE
Am. §§ 2787-2813 (1955); Wis. STAT. §§ 200.01 to
-. 25 (1953); Wyo. Comp. STAT. AN N. §§ 45-411 to
-416 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
2 In some states the powers of the state fire
marshal are incorporated into the office of the com-
missioner "of insurance, or a similar statewide office.
Commissioner of Insurance: MD. ANN. CODE GEN.
LAws art. 48A, § 83 (Supp. 1954); Commissioner of
Police: Micn. STAT. ANN. § 4.435 (Supp. 1955);
Department of Public Safety: ILL. ANN. ST.T. c.
127k , § 6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955); State Corpora-
tion Commission: VA. CODE §§ 27-66 (1954).
3 Such as the power to regulate the use of , i--
plosives; the construction and maintenance of
buildings; and the use of buildings by the public.
E.g., Ky. Rrv. STAT. § 227.220 (Baldwin Supp.
1955).
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ments of necessity and to be subject to attack
on constitutional grounds.4 The solution to this
pfroblem lies in the achievement of an effective
balance between the interests of public safety
and the protection of individual rights. The
difficulties inherent in the attainment of this
objective may be readily seen through an
analysis of the application of the several
powers of the fire marshal to the problems of
arson investigation.5
POWER To ENTER PROPERTY OR
PREMISES FOR PURPOSES OF
INVESTIGATION
The present discussion will be largely con-
fined to problems arising as the result of inves-
tigations into fires which have already occurred.
However, a clear understanding of the prob-
lems of arson investigation requires a prelimi-
nary inquiry into the powers of the fire marshal
prior to the outbreak of fire.
P~ower to inspect prior to the outbreak
I offire
The right to inspect certain premises is
included within the general police power re-
tained by the individual states.6 However, the
4 The language of the Mississippi fire marshal
statute appears to vest judicial as well as investi-
gative powers in the fire marshal, contrary to the
doctrine of separation of powers. Miss. STAT. ANN.
§ 5701 (Supp. 1954). Another constitutional con-
sideration is whether the powers granted by the
legislature to the fire prevention agency are reason-
able and bear a necessary relation to the desired ob-
jectives. Thus, if the statutory provisions are un-
reasonable or do not bear a substantial relation to
the public health, safety or welfare they are beyond
the boundaries of the police power and are in conflict
with the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See, Brown, Due Process of Law, Police
Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARv. L. REv. 943
(1927).
For a discussion of this subject see Martin,
Application of Legal Authority in Arson Investigation,
42 J. CRim. L., C. & P. S. 468 (1951).
6 Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U. S. 158 (1918).
In general, matters relating to police and fire pro-
tection are of state-wide concern and are regulated
by virtue of the police power, which accords juris-
exercise of this power is limited both by spe-
cific provisions of state constitutions and by
state statutes. State constitutions without ex-
ception prohibit unreasonable search and
seizure.7 Such restrictions, however, are ob-
viated by the use of a search warrant, which
is issued only when probable cause is shown
for the belief that the object sought is at a
particular location.8 It is generally recognized
diction to the state over such conditions as may
affect the health, safety, and welfare of the com-
munity. However, in matters of local concern, this
power may be delegated to appropriate municipal
corporations. State v. Starkey, 112 Me. 8, 90 Atl.
431 (1914); Sayre v. Phillips, 148 Pa. 482, 24 Atl.
76 (1892). For a comprehensive discussion of police
powers see Brown, Due Process of Law, Police
Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HAuv. L. REv. 943
(1927).
7 The United States Constitution provides: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
U. S. CoNsT. amend. IV. While the fourth amend-
ment applies only to federal powers, similar provi-
sions exist in most state constitutions. Such con-
stitutional restrictions do not apply to all searches
and seizures, but only to unreasonable ones. Since
the exact meaning of "reasonable" search is some-
what illusory, each case must be decided upon its
particular facts. Steine v. United States, 58 F.2d 40
(7th Cir. 1932). Examples of unreasonable searches
and seizures are to be seen in the following: a general
exploration in the hope of finding evidence of crime,
United States v. Lefkowicz, 285 U. S. 452 (1932); a
search of the house of an accused for incriminating
evidence, United States v. Kirshenbldtt, 16 F.2d
202 (2nd Cir. 1926); the opening and examining of
sealed letters and packages in the mail, Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928), Ex Parte
Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877). For a searching
analysis of this area see Comnent, 45 J. CRim. L.,
C. & P.S. 51 (1954).
1 The Illinois Constitution provides that "... no
warrant shall issue without probable cause, sup-
ported by affidavit, particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized," ILL. CoNsT. art. II, § 6. Thus, the condi-
tions precedent to the issuance of a subpoena are
two: 1) probable cause must be shown for believing
the existence of the objects of the search at the
location to be searched, and 2) the location and
[Vol. 47
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that private dwellings and places of business
cannot be searched without a warrant where
such a search would involve a trespass to
property.9 However, where a place of business,
or even a dwelling is normally open to the
general public, the fire marshal may enter the
public area without a warrant, and may seize
such contraband as is visible without breaking
and entering.10 Such inspection of a place of
business during business hours has been held
not to violate the guarantee against unreason-
able searches and seizures.1 In addition, a
search warrant is not needed in an emergency
situation where a strong possibility of immi-
nent danger exists, and where it is impractical
to first obtain a warrant." In such an emer-
gency, the fire marshal is permitted to enter
description of the objects of the search must be
specified. Moreover, officers making a search must
have a belief reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to them, justifying the search, before they
commence it. Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28
(1926). It has also been held that a search warrant
calling for the seizure of one thing will not authorize
the seizure of something else. Marron v. United
States, 275 U. S. 192 (1927).
1 "The search of a private dwelling without a
warrant is, in itself, unreasonable and abhorrent to
our laws." Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20,
32 (1925). In regard to the search of places of
business see Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282
U. S. 344 (1931); Flagg v. United States, 233 Fed.
481 (2nd Cir. 1916). Entrance without a warrant
may be gained with the consent or permission of the
owner but such consent should probably amount to
an invitation and must be voluntary. Amos v.
United States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921); United States v.
Thompson, 113 F.2d 643 (7th Cir. 1940). Welch v.
State, 184 Wis. 296, 199 N.W. 71 (1924). Falsely
claiming to have a warrant amounts to coercion,
though a threat to get one does not. Getterdam v.
United States, 5 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1925). Entrance
may also be gained as an incident to a lawful arrest.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56 (1950);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20 (1925).
10 Lee Kwong Nom v. United States, 20 F.2d
470 (2nd Cir. 1927); Ludwig v. United States, 3
F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1924); Hoch v. State, 199 Wis.
63, 225 N.W. 191 (1929).
11 State ex rel Melton v. Nolan, 161 Tenn. 293,
30 S.W. 2d 601 (1930).
12 Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948).
and investigate the premises without a search
warrant even though such inspection would
ordinarily constitute a trespass. 3
Furthermore, most states have statutes
which specifically limit the fire marshal's right
to enter and inspect. For instance, many of
these statutes contain provisions restricting
inspection to reasonable hours.j4 However, the
inspector is geneially accorded authority to
enter subject to judicial determination as to
what hours of the day or night are reasonable. 5
In some jurisdictions, inspections are limited
to buildings other than residential dwellings,
8
and many states provide that inspections may
take place only as the result- of a proper com-
plaint.
17
Power to investigate after the outbreak
of fire
Where a fire has already occurred or is in
progress and a search of the premises is neces-
sary to discover evidence of the cause, origin
or circumstances of the fire, the fire marshal
is theoretically subject to the same general
constitutional and statutory limitations as were
previously discussed. However, because of the
need to secure evidence of the cause of the fire
before such evidence is destroyed, most states
have broadened the powers of the fire marshal
to enable him to enter the premises without a
search warrant. In many instances, the power
to enter and inspect for the purpose of investi-
gation has been extended to include "all hours
of the day or night" after a fire has occurred.'8
'3 Whitcombe v. United States, 90 F.2d 290 (3rd
Cir. 1937).
14 See, e.g., FiA%. STAT. A-. § 633.06 (Supp. 1954);
KY. REv. STAT. § 227.270 (Baldwin 1955); Mass.
AN. LAws c. 148, § 4 (Supp. 1955); NEn. R v.
STAT. §J 81-512 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
Is See Martin, Appliation of Legal Authority in
Arson Investigation, 42 J. CRrm. L., C. & P.S.
468, 469 (1951).
16 See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 227.270 (Baldwin
1955); LA. REv. STAT. § 40: 1575 (Cum. Supp.
1955); ID. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws 'art. 48A, § 94
(Supp. 1954).
'7 See e.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 55, § 39 (Supp. 1953);
Miss. STAT. ANN. § 5701 (Supp. 1954).
18 See e.g., Mn. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 48A,
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In addition, this power may include the right
to "inspect neighboring premises and build-
ings."19 However, where state statutes have
not expressly conferred such broad powers, it
is necessary that the fire marshal must take
all precautions to insure the reasonableness of
the search, for if evidence secured is found to
be the product of an unreasonable and there-
fore illegal search, it may be excluded from a
subsequent criminal prosecution.20
In addition to the power to enter and in-
spect, presently possessed by the fire marshal,
the officer should be empowered to secure the
fire scene intact from subsequent alteration s
He must have the power to exclude all unau-
thorized persons from the scene of the fire
until examination and search of the premises
has been completed. The principal reason for this
requirement istoprevent the alteration, destruc-
tion or removal by unauthorized persons of
evidence which may be present. The fire scene
must not only be secured and protected from
§ 94 (Supp. 1954); MoNT. REV. CODE AN. § 82:
1217 (Supp. 1955); NEB. REv. STAT. §81: 511
(Cum. Supp. 1955).
19 
See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 48A,
§ 94 (Supp. 1954); MINN. STAT. § 73.07 (1949).
20 More than two-fifths of the states have adopted
the federal doctrine excluding evidence secured in
violation of constitutional guarantees against un-
reasonable searches and seizures. In Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949), the following states are
listed as supporting this view: Fla., Idaho, Ill.,
Ind., Iowa, Ky.. Mass., Mich., Mo., Mont., Okla.,
S. D., Tenn., Wash., W. Va., Wis., Wyo. To this
list may be added Delaware [Richards v. State, 6
Terry 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950)], North Carolina, and
Texas, which have recently passed laws in support
of the federal doctrine. McCoRamcK, EVmENCE.
§ 139 n. 7 (1954). Although the fourteenth amend-
ment does not forbid the admission of evidence ob-
tained by unreasonable search and seizure in a state
court for the prosecution of a state crime, were the
state to affirmatively sanction such police incursion
into privacy it would violate the due process guar-
antee of the fourteenth amendment. Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U. S. 27-28 (dictum 1949). See also Com-
ment, 45 J. CRlm. L., C. & P.S. 51 (1954).
2 For an informed discussion of this problem see
Brannan, Securing the Fire Scene, 6 LkAI. NEws-
LL R No. 2, p. 6 (1955).
intentional alteration;22 it must also be pro-
tected from the elements.P Furthermore, the
fire marshal must be empowered to confiscate
and take into possession any article, substance,
or material at the fire scene which might con-
stitute evidence as to the initial cause of the
fire or its subsequent extension. Such powers
have not been specifically granted to the fire
marshal for such rights have been assumed to
exist as a necessary part of the power to inves-
tigate into the cause, origin and circumstances
of each fire.24 However, in order to avoid any
situation where evidence seized at a fire scene
is denied admission into evidence at a trial
because of the manner in which it has been
secured, legislation should be encouraged which
specifically empowers the fire marshal or other
investigating officer to secure and protect the
fire scene and to seize evidence thereon with-
out first obtaining a search warrant.
POWER To CoNDuct HEAPINGS
AND To ExmN WrNxssEs
When a fire has occurred, the fire marshal
has authority to hold hearings in order to
determine whether the fire was incendiary in
nature. The authority of the fire marshal as
an administrative officer to summon witnesses
and take their testimony, and to compel the
production of relevant papers, records and
books is a purely statutory delegation accorded
the official for the purpose of determining
issues of fact.25 However, in the exercise of this
2 "It is a very common occurrence at the scene of
a fire to find the owner or occupant probing around
through the debris, ostensibly searching for missing
valuables. It may be, however, that what they are
searching for is the evidence of a set fire so that he
may destroy or remove it before the investigator
finds it." Brannan, supra note 21, at 7.
2 "The wind may blow away a bit of paper con-
taining incriminating evidence, the rain may dilute
or wash away chemicals or residue, or exposure to
snow and freezing temperatures may alter materials
to such an extent that they lose their value as evi-
dence." Brannan, supra note 21, at 7.
24 Brannan, supra note 21, at 16.
2 5Harriman v. I.C.C., 211 U. S. 497 (1908);
Matthews v. Board, 127 Mich. 630, 86 N.W. 1036
(1901)- Similar statutes have been upheld against
[Vol. 47
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authority, the fire marshal is frequently con-
fronted with problems raised by the constitu-
tional privilege of a witness not to give evi-
dence against himself. 6 This privilege is not
to be confused with the privilege against self-
incrimination possessed by an accused, i.e., one
against whom a punitive criminal proceeding
has been specifically directed.Y The privilege
of an accused prevents him from being called
such constitutional objections as improper delega-
tion of legislative power, Kansas City So. Ry. v.
United States, 231 U. S. 423 (1913); Lack of due
process of law, Natural Gas Pipe Co. v. Slattery,
302 U. S. 300 (1937); and unreasonable search and
seizure, Baltimore & O.R.R. v. I.C.C, 221 U. S. 612
(1910).
21 The privilege against self-incrimination is pro-
vided by the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution. However, the provisions of the Con-
stitution do not impose this privilege upon the
states either under the privileges and immunities
clause or the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78
(1908) (setting forth the history and policy of the
privilege). All state constitutions, except those of
Iowa and New Jersey, have similar provisions which
afford protection against self-incrimination. 8
WXGMoRE, EvrnENcE § 2252 n. 1 (3rd ed. 1940). The
usual provision states that "no person shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to give evidence against
himself.. ." ILL. CoNsT. art. II, § 10. For a com-
plete listing of the statutory provisions regarding
self-incrimination, see 8 WIGMoRE, EvmENcE § 2252
n. 3 (3rd ed. Supp. 1955). The privilege against self-
incrimination applies only to such information as
can be used against the witness in a criminal prose-
cution. See 8 WruoRE, EvmENcE § 2254 (3rd ed.
1940). It is a personal privilege of the witness and
can be invoked by no one else. Brown v. Walker,
161 U. S. 591 (1896). A corporation cannot plead
the privilege nor can it assert the personal privilege
of its officers. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338
U. S. 632 (1950); Oklahoma Press Co. v. Walling,
327 U. S. 186 (1946); Wilson v. United States, 221
U. S. 361 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43
(1906). Furthermore, if a witness waives the privi-
lege and makes partial disclosure, he must continue
and make full disclosure. Ex Parte Heddon, 29 Nev.
352, 90 Pac. 737 (1907). See also 8 WIomoRE, Evi-
DENcE § 2276 n. 2 (3rd ed. Supp. 1955).
2 Root v. McDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N.E.
684 (1927).
upon to testify.n Under the accepted view, an
investigation into the circumstances and au-
thorship of an alleged crime to determine
whether a prosecution should be instituted is
not in itself a criminal prosecution. There-
fore, the privilege against self-incrimination
will not excuse a witness from appearing, for
he must appear when summoned and may
only thereafter claim his privilege.3 0 Thus, in
an investigation by a fire marshal, witnesses
summoned must take the stand, even when
they are suspected of incendiary activities.n
If a witness has voluntarily testified at a
hearing before a fire marshal or other investi-
gating officer, his statements may be used
against him upon a subsequent indictment.u
An investigating officer is usually under no
duty to advise a witness or even an accused as
to his constitutional rights.P However, the
fact that no warning was given may be con-
sidered as an element affecting the admissibil-
ity of the statement at a later trial.' In some
23 Thus, while the ordinary witness must submit
to being called and sworn by either party and must
answer all questions except incriminating ones, the
accused is exempt from being called at all. United
States ex rel Vaitauer v. Commissioner, 273 U. S.
103 (1927); Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896).
9 Mulloney v. United States, 79 F.2d 566 (1st
Cir. 1935); State v. McDaniel, 336 Mo. 656, 80 S.W.
2d 185 (1935).
30 People v. Cahill, 193 N. Y. 232, 86 N.E. 39
(1908).
m A minority view would give the privilege of an
accused of staying off the stand to one summoned to
testify in such an investigation if the person is
suspected of criminal complicity by the officers
directing the investigation. State v. Allison, 116
Mont. 352, 153 P.2d 141 (1944).
3 People v. Farrell, 349 I1. 129, 181 N.E. 703
(1932); Commonwealth v. Selesnick, 272 Mass. 354,
172 N.E. 343 (1930); State v. Rosenweig, 168 Minn.
459, 210 N.W. 403 (1926); Ogle v. State, 193 Ind.
187, 127 N.E. 547 (1920); State v. Harris, 103 Kan.
347, 175 Pac. 153 (1918); State v. Lloyd, 152 Wis.
24, 139 N.W. 514 (1913).
3 Rohlfs v. State, 202 Wis. 54, 231 N.W. 266
(1930). For a comprehensive coverage of this topic
see INBAU & REm, LiE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION pp. 223-26 (3rd ed. 1953).
34 0gle v. State, 193 Ind. 187, 127 N.E. 547
19561
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states there are statutory provisions which
provide that testimony taken before a fire
marshal shall not be used in a subsequent
criminal action; but such immunity provisions
have been construed as applicable only when
an unwilling witness is required to testify
under oath.3 5 Furthermore, these provisions do
not apply to admissions made in private con-
versation between the officer and a witness,
where there is no obligation on the part of the
witness to speak.36
Objection is frequently raised to the exer-
cise of the statutory power of the fire marshal
to render the hearing private by "excluding
all persons other than those required to be
present" when the official, in his discretion,
deems such exclusion appropriate.3Y The usual
reason offered for this requirement is to pre-
vent the hearing from becoming unwieldy and
to induce witnesses to testify more freely.
However, it has been argued that the exercise
of such a power may deprive suspects of the
benefit of counsel. Federal courts have upheld
(1920). This view is based on the rationale that
such testimony is not voluntary unless given with
full knowledge of its consequences, and that the
fact that no warning was given should be taken
into consideration in determining the voluntariness
(and therefore the admissibility) of a confession.
See also INBAU & Rxmo, LiE DTEcTioN Ai
CRnMNAL INTERSOGATIoN p. 224, n. 217 (3rd ed.
1953). However, such testimony is not open to the
objection that it is involuntary merely because it
was given in response to a subpoena, nor because a
witness who might refuse to appear or to testify
was subject to punishment, nor because of a statu-
tory provision that no person shall be present at
the investigation except the officers. State v. Harris,
103 Kan. 347, 175 Pac. 153 (1918).5 People v. Ales, 247 N.Y. 351, 160 N.E. 395
(1928) (referring to New York City ordinance). Im-
munity provisions were deleted from the Indiana
statutes by a 1917 amendment. However, see
Mica. STAT. ANq. § 4.559(7) (Supp. 1955); Nas.
Rxv. STAT. § 81: 509 (Cum. Supp. 1955).
38People v. Ales, 247 N.Y. 351, 160 N.E. 395
(1928).
-1 See, e.g, ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 127M, § 8 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1955); Ky. Rav. STAT. § 227.280
(Baldwin 1955); LA. REv. STAT. § 40: 1571 (Cum.
Supp. 1952).
the inherent right of an accused to counsel,38
and many states specifically guarantee the
right to counsel either by constitutional or by
statutory provisions.3 The usual provision
limits the right to criminal proceedings and
many statutes guarantee the right to counsel
only in capital offenses. 40 In a recent case, the
Ohio Supreme Court, observing that fire mar-
shal investigations are neither trials nor crimi-
nal proceedings and that there is no accused
party, held that the provisions of the state
constitution guaranteeing the right to counsel
do not apply to such investigations.4 Further-
more, if it is correctly maintained that the
nature of the hearing is solely investigative,
then, were witnesses to employ counsel for the
purpose of examination and cross-examination,
or any other purpose, it is apparent that the
processes of investigation would be greatly re-
tarded. In an effort to facilitate the investiga-
tive process, the use of the provision excluding
all persons other than those deemed to be
required by the fire marshal should be encour-
aged. However, in order that the privilege
against self-incrimination may be preserved
in practice, the hearing officer should be re-
quired to advise those witnesses who are also
suspects of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
Another problem which arises in the course
of an investigation is the exclusion of unneces-
sary witnesses and the separation of witnesses
prior to the time when their testimony is to
be taken. Most fire marshal acts provide that
witnesses may be excluded from the place
where the investigation is held, and may be
separated from each other until they have
been examined.A The purpose of such a pro-
" Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U. S. 274 (1946).
3 9E.g., OHIO CONST. art. I § 10, which reads in
part: "In any trial, in any court, the party accused
shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and
' with counsel."
40 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938).
4 In re Groban, 164 Ohio St. 26, 128 N.E. 2d
106 (1955), cert. granted, 351 U. S. 903 (1956).
42 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws c. 148 § 3 (Supp.
1955); Miss. STAT. ANx. § 5701 (Supp. 1954); N. C.
GEN..STAT. § 69-3 (Supp. 1955).
[Vol. 47
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vision is to prevent collusion on the part of
the assembled witnesses. However, the means
used to achieve this result must be reasonable
and should impose no undue hardship upon
the witnesses. This difficulty may be resolved
by permitting the fire marshal merely to ex-
dude witnesses from the place of hearing or
investigation and to place them in the care of
someone charged with the duty of preventing
communication between the witnesses.
In the use of the subpoena duces tecum to
obtain documentary evidence, the fire marshal
is subject to piohibitions similar to those which
exist in regard to the examination of witnesses.
Thus, he may not compel the production of
private books or papers which may be used as
evidence against the owner of such articles in
a subsequent prosecution.m Although analo-
gous to the situation where a witness is called
upon to testify against himself, the privilege
here can be invoked only by the owner who is
also in possession of the documents. 5 A person
in possession of the documents who is not the
owner can be compelled to produce them even
though they might incriminate him.
46
Most states have provided measures to en-
force compliance with the orders and sub-
poenas of the fire marshal. While the usual
procedure is to apply for a court order to en-
force the subpoena or order,4 it appears that
43 The fire marshal need not restrict witnesses in
order to separate them. Geldon v. Finnegan, 213
Wis. 539, 252 N.W. 369 (1934).4
1 However, the seizure of such papers should be
distinguished from the seizure of contraband or
similar articles which clearly belong in the custody
of the law. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
4 5 The property to be produced must be specifi-
cally described according to the kind of property
involved. The fact that papers have been obtained
by illegal search will not.necessarily prevent them
from being introduced into evidence, although
courts following the federal rule will exclude evi-
dence obtained by such methods. Gambino v.
United States, 275 U. S. 310 (1927).
4
6 Ex Parte Hedden, 29 Nev. 352, 90 Pac. 737
(1907). See also, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S.
48 (1951).
47 See, e.g., ALA. Conn tit. 55, §49 (Supp. 1953);
MINN. STAT. § 73.06 (1949).
at least one state has given the fire marshal
authority to hold original contempt proceed-
ings, and to himself impose penalties of fines
and imprisonment for non-compliance." Such
powers, however, have the effect of transform-
ing an administrative hearing into a judicial
proceeding. Therefore, in order to protect those
affected from the arbitrary actions associated
with the consolidation of administrative and
judical powers, those functions should be sepa-
rated by allowing the investigating officer only
such authority as is necessary to obtain a
court order enforcing compliance.
Most statutes are silent as to where the
hearing is to be held and as to whether a wit-
ness can be summoned from an outlying
county.4 However, the Kentucky Supreme
Court has held that, although the fire marshal
may hold a hearing in any county of the state,
he may only bring witnesses to the county in
which the fire occurred. 50 While this require-
ment prevents unreasonable inconvenience to
witnesses, it also places an undue burden upon
the arson investigator. In many instances,
witnesses and records may only be found in
counties other than the one in which the fire
occurred and the fire marshal may desire to
summon witnesses to such county for a hear-
ing. Therefore, in order to expedite the proc-
esses of investigation, the fire marshal should
be empowered to hold hearings and summon
witnesses in any county of the state. It is
further suggested that there be nationwide
reciprocity between the states in the matter of
summoning witnesses to investigative and
48 See, e.g., Miss. STAT. ANN. § 5701 (Supp. 1954)
(Powers of a trial justice). The penalties provided
are of a severity similar to those imposed for any
other misdemeanor. Moreover, witnesses called in
fire marshall proceedings are usually heard only
upon oath or affirmation as provided by statute,
being subject to the same penalties for perjury as are
witnesses in purely judicial proceedings.
49 See Martin, Appliation of Legal Authiority in
Arson Investigation, 42 J. Cn,. L., C. & P.S. 68, 80
(1951).
50 Commonwealth v. Ransdall, 153 Ky. 334, 155
S.W. 1117 (1913); see also Rhinehart v. State, 121
Tenn. 420,117 S.W. 508 (1908).
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criminal proceedings. Such a provision would
be especially helpful in investigating fires
which have occurred near state boundaries, or
where witnesses have fled to other states.
POWER TO CAUSE ARREsT
The power of the fire marshal to make an
arrest is based largely upon statutory provi-
sions. In many jurisdictions the fire marshal's
power to cause arrest is limited to initiating
the complaintA' However, some states have
given the fire marshal specific authority to
make arrests.2 Supplementing these statutory
powers are the powers which the fire marshal
may have as a private person or as a law en-
forcement officer." Other than in these in-
stances, arrests must be made by police officers
as the result of the issuance of warrants of
arrest- Inasmuch as the power to arrest is
such a vital power, it should be exercised with
a great deal of caution. However, where suffi-
cient time is not available to obtain a warrant
of arrest, and where there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the crime of arson
has been committed and that the suspect did
commit such crime, the fire marshal, as a law
51 See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 127j1, § 7 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1955); N. H. REv. STAT. c. 175 § 28
(1955).
52 See, e.g., N. C. GEN. STAT. § 69.2 (Supp. 1955)
(with warrant).
63 Both police officers and private individuals
may arrest without a warrant for a felony or mis-
demeanor involving a breach of the peace committed
in their presence, and for a felony which was in fact
committed although not in the presence of the
officer or individual making the arrest. However,
the police officer's authority goes beyond that of the
individual in that the police officer may arrest when
he has reasonable grounds to believe that a felony
has been committed and that the person being ar-
rested has committed it.
m Such a warrant directs the arrest of a person or
persons upon the grounds stated therein, and relieves
the officer making the arrest of civil liability, pro-
vided that the warrant is valid and fair upon its
face.
enforcement officer familiar with the circum-
stances of the situation, should have the power
to make the arrest.
CONCLUSION
When a fire has occurred, the public interest
requires that the investigative agency have all
reasonable powers necessary to determine its
origin. Such powers must include the right to
examine the immediate area in which the fire
took place and to collect evidence for possible
criminal prosecution. In addition, the fire mar-
shal or any deputy fire marshal, must be em-
powered to hold hearings, to summon witnesses
and to compel the production of all relevant
documents. The investigating officer should
have the authority to hold such hearings in,
and to summon witnesses to any county in the
state. The officer should have the discretion to
render the hearing private when such action
will facilitate the investigative process. Such
privacy, however, should not operate to defeat
the constitutional privilege of a witness. Thus,
where counsel is not allowed to be present, the
presiding officer should inform a suspect that
his testimony may later be used in a criminal
proceeding. Compliance with the orders of the
fire marshal should be assured by permitting
him to obtain a court order directing a citation
for contempt upon non-compliance. Where
there is evidence of criminal activities, the
investigative agency should be empowered to
initiate complaints against those involved and
submit evidence to secure their conviction. In-
cidental thereto, the powers of arrest should
be exercised when necessary. However, con-
stitutional protections must remain inviolate.
Powers granted in the public interest should
not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with
the guaranteed rights of individuals."5
U5 For an interesting analysis of this problem see
BEISEL, CONTROL OVER ILLEGAL ENFORcEmENT or
TH CRnAL LAW: RoLx OF THE SuPREmE COURT
(1955).
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